15 ideas
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |